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Abstract. This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience—brain reward 
function—to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called ‘Heuristic Identity Theory’ 
(HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to 
provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different 
ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other 
conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory 
so much as a relabeling of previously discussed strategies for mechanistic discovery. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The central thesis of the mind/brain identity theory is that every type of mental 
state or process is identical with some type of brain state or process. Early 
proponents of the theory intended to rebut two general claims: that mental states 
and processes are something other than brain states and processes, and that mental 
states are merely correlated with brain states.1 Later proponents of the theory 
intended to enshrine a few further theoretical commitments: that kinds of mental 
states and processes are reducible without remainder to certain kinds of states and 
processes in the brain; that the identity relation involved in mind/brain identity 
statements is necessary; and that mind/brain identity statements are neither analytic 
nor a priori. 
Sadly, the identity theory fell on hard times. From the early 1960s to the late 
1980s, it was beleaguered by numerous philosophical challenges, including concerns 
over multiple realizability, violations of Leibniz’s law and the modal logic of identity 
statements, and the apparent incorrigibility of introspective reports.2 Since the early 
1990s, examinations of case studies and actual scientific practice have become 
equally important prongs in both challenges to, and defenses of, philosophical 
theses about mind/brain relationships (Bickle 2003); but unfortunately, traditional 
identity theorists have had a paucity of cases of psychoneural identities to celebrate. 
These challenges have created the conditions for an alternative to the traditional 
identity theory, dubbed the ‘Heuristic Identity Theory’ (HIT). The traditional theory 
																																																						
1 See Place (1956); Feigl (1958); Smart (1959); Armstrong (1968). Note that identity theorists have 
often interpreted uses of the term brain states as being ‘just a placeholder for whatever the eventual 
working parts of brains—in fact, of nervous systems, perhaps embodied nervous systems—turn out to 
be’ (Polger 2009: 3). 
2 For defenses of the identity theory on conceptual and empirical grounds, see, e.g., Enç (1983); 
Shapiro (2000); Sufka & Lynch (2000); Polger (2004, 2009); Couch (2004); Shapiro & Polger (2012).	
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supposes that scientists work by generating psychoneural correlations and then 
accumulating evidence for type-identities to explain them. According to HIT, this 
supposition puts the cart before the horse. Psychoneural identities are not 
discovered after a period of protracted scientific research; instead, scientists 
intrepidly hypothesize them at the outset of inquiry and then use those hypotheses 
as a discovery heuristic for driving further research. 
Interest in HIT has coincided with other favored philosophical trends, including 
the recrimination of reductionist themes in the psychological sciences, the rise of 
explanatory pluralism, and the mechanistic approach to explanation. Embracing 
pluralism and mechanistic explanation in particular (e.g., Bechtel & Wright 2009), 
advocates of HIT have appealed to a few cases from neuroscientific practice to 
support the claim that ‘hypothetical identities […] regularly serve as the critical 
premises in explanatory proposals that inaugurate new lines of scientific 
investigation’ (McCauley 2012: 192). 
This paper examines this claim, asking two questions. Has HIT received 
sufficiently convincing empirical support? Is HIT a genuine alternative to the 
traditional identity theory? 
To answer these questions, we shall proceed as follows. In §2, we survey HIT’s 
basic commitments. In §3, we detail the history of electrophysiological and 
neuropharmacological research on brain reward function (BRF), which provides an 
exemplary case study against which to test the predictions and commitments of 
HIT. Unexpectedly, this case failed to support HIT, motivating closer scrutiny of 
previously invoked cases. In §4, we argue that, on a standard conception of identity, 
these previous cases also fail to provide convincing empirical support for HIT; on a 
broader conception of identity, existing case studies do support HIT, but not as a 
version of identity theory, as advocates present it. 
Philosophical attempts to detail the claims of HIT have only supported a broadly 
mechanistic approach to mechanistic explanation and mechanism discovery, which 
often posits hypotheses about the localization of psychological functions in the 
brain, or hypotheses about the causal production of psychological phenomena by 
certain neural mechanisms. While scientists often advance such hypotheses as 
heuristics for discovering mechanisms (Bechtel & Richardson 1993/2010), it is a 
mistake to confuse these relations for the identity relation. As it is not a theory 
about identity, HIT is not any kind of mind/brain identity theory. In particular, 
HIT is not a new alternative identity theory so much as an epicycle on what has 
been called the ‘new mechanical philosophy’ in cognitive neuroscience. We consider 
various additional conceptual problems in §§5–6, and conclude in §7. 
 
 
2. Heuristic Identity Theory 
 
2.1. ORIGINATION 
 
HIT seems to have originated from remarks by William Wimsatt (1976a: 227–229), 
who suggested that explanation—not reduction—is the proper context in which to 
understand the role of psychoneural identities in science. For Wimsatt, identities are 
not the endpoint or goal of an intertheoretic reduction, and they do not serve as a 
regulative ideal against which intertheoretical relations are formally judged. Rather, 
they are ‘tools’ used primarily to ferret out errors, and thus play a merely enabling 
role upstream in the process of refining explanations: ‘[i]dentity claims […] provide 
probes of potentially unlimited sensitivity and depth for pinpointing sources of 
explanatory failures’ (1976a: 227). Wimsatt’s remarks were later reformulated, en 
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passant, by Robert McCauley: 
 
Instead of identities being assigned late in the game to those coextensionalities which prove 
persistently recalcitrant to explanation, they are often proposed relatively early, initiating 
wholly new lines of research. When in doubt (many scientists) assume the truth of a proposed 
identity until empirical research clearly indicates otherwise. The postulation of identities is a 
research tool for extending the explanatory range of theories. They are not proposed as the 
grounds for justifying eliminative moves in microreductions (even if, after the fact, they may 
be cited as such). (1981: 225) 
 
Unfortunately, HIT went dark after these two opening salvos, but was resurrected 
in a series of papers by McCauley & William Bechtel.3 
From this body of work emerged the central thesis of HIT: identity statements 
are discovery heuristics.4 Bechtel & McCauley put the thesis this way: ‘claims 
between psychological processes and neural mechanisms [sic] are advanced as 
heuristics that serve to guide further research’ (1999: 71). The thought is that 
identity statements play a heuristic role in the initial development and guidance of 
research in multiple fields and at multiple levels of analysis: ‘identity claims are made 
early in a research program and serve as heuristic for further research’ (Bechtel 
2002: 236). 
The process of advancing heuristic identities has multiple phases, which 
McCauley & Bechtel (2001: 751) described as follows. Initially, identity statements 
involve discrepancies. These discrepancies prompt further research at various levels 
of analysis to ascertain which proposals should prevail or in which directions to 
proceed. Next, this further research yields more precise hypotheses about the 
systems and patterns engaged, provoking new speculations at multiple explanatory 
levels. Then, speculations imply new ways of orchestrating familiar facts and 
theories within levels, and suggest new avenues of research. Finally, some of these 
avenues of research produce new cross-scientific conflicts, which likely begin this 
cycle anew. 
So, in positing identities between mental states or processes and neural states or 
processes, scientists can apply knowledge of neural mechanisms to guide the 
development of models of mental states and processes at higher levels of analysis; 
and then they can justifiably rely on knowledge of mental states and processes to 
search for lower-level neural mechanisms. As McCauley & Bechtel put it, ‘what we 
learn about an entity or process under one description should apply to it under its 
other descriptions’ (2001: 753), which Bechtel repeats elsewhere: ‘[… u]nlike [the] 
traditional identity theory, the focus is on using the differences between what is 
known about the processes under each description as a discovery heuristic to revise 
the other’ (2008a: 990). For advocates of HIT, what ultimately matters is the 
explosive amount of science that can be generated by positing identities. If 
psychoneural identities play this role—fecundity—in scientific practice, then HIT 
would rest vindicated in a way that eschews the metaphysical issues raised by 
traditional versions of identity theory. 
 
2.2. THREE OVERARCHING COMMITMENTS 
 
The thesis that identity statements are discovery heuristics is analyzable into at least 
																																																						
3 Bechtel & McCauley (1999); McCauley & Bechtel (2001); Bechtel (2002, 2008a,b); McCauley 
(2012); see also Schouten & Looren de Jong (2001); Looren de Jong (2006); Bechtel & Hamilton 
(2007). 
4 See McCauley & Bechtel (2001: 753) and Bechtel (2008b: 71); see also Bechtel & McCauley (1999: 
67, 71); Bechtel & Hamilton (2007: 414). 
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three successive commitments. Firstly, identity statements are ‘thoroughly 
hypothetical’ statements about psychoneural relations (Bechtel & McCauley 1999: 
67, 71). Secondly, these hypothetical identity statements are posited at the outset of 
a period of scientific research. As Bechtel & McCauley wrote, ‘scientists adopt 
[identity statements] as hypotheses in the course of empirical investigation to guide 
subsequent inquiry, rather than settling on them merely as the results of such 
inquiry’ (1999: 67; see also Bechtel 2002: 236), and again, ‘[i]dentity claims (e.g., that 
water is H2O or pain is C-fiber firing) are […] made at the outset of investigation, 
often on the basis of a limited number of correlations’ (Bechtel 2008b: 70). Thirdly, 
these inaugural statements are then used to facilitate self-correcting research at 
multiple levels of analysis and explanation. As Bechtel wrote, ‘[t]he one thing that is 
necessary in an overly simple initial hypothesis is that it suggest a line of research 
that can reveal its own inadequacies and hence point to profitable revisions’ (2002: 
235). 
These three commitments imply several interesting features. One is that, being 
thoroughly hypothetical statements about psychoneural relations, these identities 
have truth-values (and so are truth-apt). Another is that these thoroughly 
hypothetical truth-evaluable statements are empirical. A third feature is that these 
thoroughly hypothetical truth-evaluable empirical statements are expected to be 
descriptively inadequate (typically, either false or else not true, relative to which 
logics are employed). Advocates of HIT have been clear and consistent in 
characterizing identities as statements that are expressly introduced to generate 
research that may heuristically expose its own errors and lead to improvements in 
our epistemic situation. Indeed, because their revision and refinement is a central 
objective of subsequent scientific research, these identities are intended to be 
disposable—i.e., the proverbial ‘ladder’ that is eventually thrown away after 
stimulating new research—unlike scientific truths, which are usually precious and 
hard-won. 
 
2.3. AN INDUCTION OVER CASES 
 
Advocates present HIT as a general strategy of discovery that is commonly 
employed during the early stages of inquiry, particularly in cognitive neuroscience 
(Bechtel & McCauley 1999: 67). The justification for HIT is generated by the 
method of induction over cases: advocates attempt to document many actual cases 
in a variety of scientific fields, where identity statements are made at the outset of 
research and subsequently play a heuristic role in driving future research before 
eventually being discarded. Consequently, if HIT were correct and faithful to 
scientific practice, we would expect an array of supporting historical episodes 
throughout the sciences. 
Bechtel & McCauley (1999) and McCauley & Bechtel (2001) made their initial 
case for HIT by appealing to early research on vision, and Bechtel’s (2008b) account 
of memory encoding was the only other main documented test case of heuristic 
psychoneural identities for almost a decade. Another case study pertaining to 
human face recognition was recently proposed in an attempt to strengthen this 
induction (Burnston et al. 2011; McCauley 2012; cf. Kievit et al. 2011). 
The basic form of each case study is threefold: a report of the onset of a research 
period, in which an alleged identity statement bridged research at different levels of 
analysis and explanation, followed by evidence that the identity statement provided 
the impetus for increasingly sophisticated research and new scientific discoveries at 
different levels; and finally, in order to show that identity statements are heuristic 
and disposable, a demonstration that the identity statement was later discarded once 
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the task of enabling was discharged. 
One problem confronting HIT is that two or three (or even four) cases make for 
a weak induction, and does not support the claim that HIT is ‘a common discovery 
strategy in science’ (Bechtel 2008b: 71). Accordingly, we turn to the history of 
electrophysiological and psychopharmacological research on brain reward function 
(BRF) in the following section. With a clearly demarcated period of inquiry, 
research at multiple levels of analysis connecting psychological and neural states, a 
variety of human and non-human animal studies, rapid scientific discovery at 
multiple levels, and clear parallels with the cases HIT advocates have already 
appealed to, we initially hypothesized that BRF research would be fertile ground for 
psychoneural identity claims, and would yield additional empirical support for HIT. 
 
 
3. Heuristic Identity Theory (Or Back to the Past): Locating Identity Claims 
in BRF Research 
 
3.1. ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY: THE FIRST STREAM (1950–1956) 
 
3.1.1. Serendipitous discoveries 
In 1950, Robert Heath led a Tulane University medical team in exploring whether 
electrical stimulation could effectively treat schizophrenia. By the summer of 1952, 
Heath’s team had operated on 24 (conscious) patients, stimulating various 
regions—including the caudate, hypothalamus, anterior thalamus, and septal area—
while each patient reported their subjective experiences. ‘Alertness’ was commonly 
mentioned, and patients also reported experiencing anxiety, confusion, and lucidity. 
But in the four cases involving septal stimulation, patients described their 
experiences as ‘jovial’, ‘euphoric’, and ‘pleasant’ (Heath 1954). Unfortunately, Heath 
was primed to focus on observations regarding the relation between stimulation and 
alertness, and overlooked the significance of the serendipitous discovery that septal 
stimulation was associated with pleasure (Baumeister 2006: 97). 
While Heath’s team was performing their surgical experiments at Tulane, Peter 
Milner was at McGill University conducting his doctoral work under Donald 
Hebb’s supervision; Seth Sharpless, a philosophy student from Chicago, was 
working likewise in Herbert Jasper’s nearby laboratory. With Sharpless, Milner ran 
pilot experiments on electrical stimulation of rats’ reticular activating system; but 
they were only able to demonstrate that the stimulation was aversive (rather than 
motivating, as they had hoped). In the fall of 1953, James Olds arrived at McGill to 
begin his postdoctoral fellowship, and Hebb had Milner teach Olds some basic 
neuroanatomy along with their intracranial self-stimulation (ICSS) paradigm. Olds’s 
initial attempt to plant an electrode in the reticular activating system unexpectedly 
resulted in one rat who behaved as if it were being rewarded by stimulation. X-rays 
confirmed that Olds’s implantation had missed its mark, and that the electrode tip 
had instead terminated near the septal area. 
Further ICSS experiments allowed Olds & Milner to demonstrate that rats will 
work hard to repeatedly operate a manipulandum for direct electrical stimulation to 
the midbrain. In one case, a rat repeatedly bar-pressed 7,500 times in 12 hours 
(1954: 425). In some cases, response rates rose nearly to 5,000 times in an hour; and 
in another case, one rat bar-pressed up to 2,000 times per hour for 24 consecutive 
hours (1956b: 114–115). The most robust and reliable ICSS-elicited behavior was 
generated from the median forebrain bundle (MFB) in the mesolimbic system, 
which Olds (1956b)—in his exposé of their discovery—called the brain’s ‘pleasure 
center’. 
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Together, these two serendipitous discoveries—one pursued, one not—mark the 
outset of over 60 years of inquiry into brain reward function. Olds & Milner’s 
(1954) demonstration that stimulation could be highly rewarding (or pleasurable or 
motivating or reinforcing—they knew not which) immediately instigated hundreds 
of further studies attempting to replicate and interpret their findings. Because they 
provide an operationally-defined measure of reward function, ICSS experiments 
quickly became a dominant investigative approach to plumbing the relationship 
between states involving neural activation of the MFB and the hedonic state of 
psychological pleasure. Within just a few years, experimenters showed that the 
neural circuitries subserving reward function could be homologously activated in a 
wide range of non-human animals beyond rats (e.g., snails, fish, rabbits, cats, guinea 
pigs, dogs, horses, and various non-human primates), suggesting a conservation of 
evolutionarily-basic mechanisms across reward-dependent neural state types. Later 
experiments also confirmed that electrical stimulation of specific brain regions has 
the same impact on motivation as other natural rewards, like food or water for 
hungry or thirsty animals (Morrison 1955; Brady et al. 1957; Trowill et al. 1969). 
 
3.1.2. Identity crisis 
The discovery of the brain’s ‘pleasure center’ was a major episode in the history of 
behavioral neuroscience. HIT implies that we should expect hypothetical 
psychoneural identity claims at the outset of inquiry—i.e., statements of the form x 
is y or x is identical to y, where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are the types of mental and neural relata 
named in statements of identity or equality (e.g., ‘pleasure = MFB activation’). A close 
examination of this initial period of research, however, reveals no such statements.  
Olds & Milner (1954) emphasized three ‘reward’ regions: the septal area, 
cingulate cortex, and mammillothalamic tract. Their observations led them to make 
three main classes of claims. First were claims of correlation. For instance, in 
reviewing the previous decade of ICSS work in rodents, Olds & Olds concluded 
that ‘[…] the correlation of positive reinforcement with the anatomic system based 
on the medial forebrain bundle appears to be valid’ (1963: 271; see also Olds 1956a: 
281). In human patients, Heath & Gallant observed, ‘[i]n 14 of our 54 patients, we 
were able to correlate some types of reproducible electrical activity in specific areas 
of the brain with patterns of thought activity […] The outstanding feature of the 
data obtained with our methods is a correlation between physical activity in specific 
parts of the old olfactory structures of the brain and emotional behavior’ (1964: 86, 
104). And in his literature review on ICSS and BRF, Philip Zeigler responded to the 
complaint that the greatest gap in physiological psychology is the absence of any 
convincing physiological correlate of learning and motivation by saying that 
‘[e]lectrical stimulation of the brain is among the most promising of the available 
techniques for establishing such correlates’ (1957: 363). 
Second were localization claims: e.g., ‘[w]e are led to speculate that a system of 
structures previously attributed to the rhinencephalon may provide the locus for the 
reward phenomenon’, and again, ‘[t]he brain does seem to have definite loci of 
pleasure and pain, and we shall review here the experiments which have led to this 
conclusion. […] Our present tentative conclusion is that emotional and 
motivational mechanisms can indeed be localized in the brain’ (Olds & Milner 1954: 
425; Olds 1956b: 105, 116; see also Bursten & Delgado 1958). Zeigler, 
encapsulating these first two kinds of claims, lamented that ‘[o]n the basis of the 
studies reported thus far, only one anatomical generalization may be made. All the 
structures involved in this phenomenon may be included in or related to the so-
called ‘limbic system” (1957: 363, 373). 
Third were claims about the causal and functional roles of certain neural 
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processes: e.g., ‘electrical stimulation in the septal area has an effect which is 
apparently equivalent to that of a conventional primary reward […]’ (Olds & Milner 
1954: 421); and e.g., ‘[… w]e have perhaps located a system within the brain whose 
peculiar function is to produce a rewarding effect on behavior’, and again, ‘[…] 
there is an area in the basomedial forebrain at about the level where the islands of 
calleja are most pronounced where electrical stimulation has extremely great 
rewarding effects’ (1954: 426; Olds, 1956c: 511). Other scientists building on Olds 
& Milner’s initial discovery took them to have ‘demonstrated a rewarding effect 
produced by electric stimulation of some areas of the brain’ (Sidman et al. 1955: 
830; see also Olds 1958), although a few were less assertive. Zeigler, encapsulating 
these latter two kinds of claims, cautioned that ‘[i]t has not yet been conclusively 
demonstrated that we are dealing with ‘pleasure centers’ or ‘a system within the 
brain whose function it is to produce a rewarding effect upon behavior” (1957: 
373). Even still, the use of causal-mechanical production-language of the form activity 
in brain region x produces or elicits effect y turns out to be a persistent trend in early ICSS 
literature. But to interpret this production-language in terms of heuristic identities 
would be to commit the infamous ‘Betty Crocker fallacy’ in which non-causal 
relations like identity or constitution are confused for causal ones (Churchland 
1998). To their credit, advocates of HIT have typically avoided this fallacy (e.g., 
Wimsatt 1976a,b; Craver & Bechtel 2007); but continuing to do so requires 
restricting their basis of textual evidence so that statements about the causal 
production of mental states and processes are not confused with identity 
statements. Prima facie, production is one relation, identity another. 
These three types of relational claims—i.e., correlation, localization, and 
causal/functional role ascription—are no more consistent with HIT than with its 
competitors; traditional identity theorists and functionalists, for example, could 
accommodate them all. More problematically, whereas these three types of 
relational claims are ubiquitous in the scientific literature, relational claims about any 
kind of identity (type/type, token/token, etc.) are altogether absent from all major 
scientific reports comprising the early ICSS literature. Heath’s work did not include 
them. Olds’s papers did not include them; neither did Milner’s, nor their joint 
papers, nor those that they wrote with neuroscientists Brenda Milner or Marianne 
Olds. Identity claims are also absent from the Masters thesis of Olds’s main student 
at the time, Rolfe Morrison, and they do not appear in Sharpless’s work with Jasper. 
A fourth class of claims were those of a merely predicational nature: e.g., ‘[there 
are] subcortical areas in the human brain in which brief electrical stimulation 
appears to have rewarding or reinforcing properties’ (Bishop et al. 1963: 396). But 
in all such cases, statements of predication, function and production, location, or 
correlation fail to amount to anything resembling the identity claims, and so fail to 
vindicate HIT. Since the ICSS literature provides a canonical case study for HIT 
and HIT implies that identity statements are posited at the outset of research, the 
lack of identities in the literature is unsettling. 
 
3.2. NEUROPHARMACOLOGY: THE SECOND STREAM (1957–1976) 
 
3.2.1. Dopamine 
Just when the electrophysiology of BRF was taking shape, so too was the 
neurochemistry underlying reward. The mid-1950s saw early suggestions concerning 
the physiological significance of dopamine (DA), along with further discovery of 
DA within the brain (Blaschko 1957; Montagu 1957; Carlsson et al. 1958). As 
investigations into the occurrence of DA neurons continued, areas with high 
concentrations of DA (specifically the corpus striatum) were shown to contain less 
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noradrenaline (NA) than expected (Bertler & Rosengren 1959). Some took the 
distribution of DA in the brain to indicate a function unique to this previously-
overlooked neurotransmitter (Carlsson 1959). Advancements in histochemical 
methods allowed researchers to trace the brain pathways of catecholamine neurons 
within a decade, leading to the discovery of a nigro-neostriatal DA neuron system, 
and DA pathways projecting from the substantia nigra pars compacta and the 
ventral tegmental area (Dahlstrom & Fuxe 1965; Anden et al. 1966; Hornykiewicz 
1966). 
Neuropharmacological research proved to be integral to the formation of 
catecholaminergic theories of reward. In one of the earliest attempts to bridge 
neuropharmacological and electrophysiological ICSS research, Olds et al. (1956) 
showed that reserpine and other catecholamine-blocking tranquilizers diminished 
reward functionality in hypothalamic- and septal-area electrode placements. Other 
early experiments investigated the effects of tranquilizing agents on rates of self-
stimulation, and, following histochemically-verified sites of NA fibers, led to the 
hypothesis that reward was primarily mediated by NA (Olds & Travis 1960; Stein 
1968; Margules 1969). The noradrenergic theory of reward was further bolstered by 
the finding that tendencies toward self-stimulation were abolished by inhibiting the 
conversion of DA to NA (Stein & Wise 1969; Wise & Stein 1969). 
The 1970s, however, saw the role previously ascribed to NA eclipsed in favor of 
a dopaminergic theory of reward.5 Facilitation of DA activity with DA agonists (e.g., 
amphetamine) have concomitant effects on ICSS response rates (Crow 1972), while 
administration of DA antagonists suppress self-stimulation (Franklin 1978). On the 
other hand, neither DA-b-hydroxylase inhibitors (e.g., disulfuram), which selectively 
block NA synthesis without perturbing DA, nor neurochemical 6-hydroxydopamine 
lesions of nuclei in the lower brain stem (e.g., A1, A2, A5, A7) and locus coeruleus 
(A6), which deplete forebrain NA, diminished self-stimulation behavior (Lippa et al. 
1973; Clavier et al. 1976; Koob et al. 1976; Corbett et al. 1977). These and other 
findings led to the emergence of the DA theory of reward as the most promising 
and fruitful investigative direction. 
The catecholaminergic theories of reward advanced in the late 1960s and 1970s 
would seem to be a good place to uncover some of the identity claims predicted by 
HIT. Identification of the psychological states of pleasure and reward—not simply 
with states of the MFB as its neuroanatomical locus—but with the activities or 
processes of neurotransmitters (e.g., NA and DA) throughout the brain’s 
mesocorticolimbic systems, would square nicely with the standard HIT narrative. 
While relatively simplistic hypotheses involving certain mental states and neural 
states were superseded by those involving NA, and later, DA activity, statements of 
identity relations remain absent from the scientific literature. With regard to earlier 
NA theories of reward, one sees the same classes of claims: production, correlation, 
localization, and functional role ascription—and occasional grounding-like claims. 
For instance, Stein stated that ‘[…] electrical stimulation of the MFB produces at 
least part of its rewarding […] effect by activating adrenergic synapses in the lateral 
hypothalamus, pre-optic area, limbic lobe, and neocortex’ (1967: 139). Commenting 
on the significance of the observed release of NA into the rostral hypothalamus and 
amygdala by ‘rewarding MFB stimulation’ Stein & Wise concluded ‘that the release 
of norepinephrine at these and other terminal sites of the MFB in the forebrain is 
responsible, at least in part, for the facilitation of behavior caused by rewarding 
stimulation’ (1969: 197). Cutting to the chase, Margules reported that ‘[…] dorsal 
																																																						
5 For an overview of this literature, see Hornykiewicz (1986, 2002); Milner (1991); Marsden (2006); 
Wise (2008). 
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tegmental reward has a noradrenergic basis’ (1969: 34). These and hundreds of 
other similar statements again reveal that identity claims—heuristic or otherwise—
are not posited at the outset of research. Rather than claims about the relation of 
identity between psychological states of pleasure, reward, motivation, or the like, on 
one hand, and the activity of a major neurotransmitter system on the other—as one 
would expect if HIT were correct, what one finds are attributions of a generic 
‘basis’ or ‘role’ of various neurotransmitters in the reward phenomenon.6 
In sum, examination of the history of BRF research reveals no heuristic identity 
statements at the outset of inquiry. In these early stages, scientists instead ventured 
claims about correlation, localization, and causal/functional roles. This result—
contrary to our initial hypothesis—is both puzzling, since BRF research should be 
relatively ideal ground for HIT, and worrisome, since the argument for HIT is an 
induction over (presently few) cases. To be clear, no one thinks that a single 
disconfirming case or counterexample demonstrates that HIT is incorrect. But what 
the absence of identity statements does do is warrant doubt and further scrutiny. 
 
 
4. Re-evaluating HIT 
 
4.1. ESTABLISHING THE OUTSET OF INQUIRY 
 
Can the absence of heuristic identity statements be explained away? One possibility 
would be to suggest either that they occurred much earlier than the 1950s, or else 
occurred much later. Neither of these goalpost-moving gambits is likely to work, 
however. 
While some interesting research on pleasure and euphoria was conducted at the 
end of the 19th century, much of it was conceptual and most scholars demured from 
asserting identities. For instance, Henry Rutgers Marshall, whose algedonic 
continuum theory of pain/pleasure eschewed the identification of pleasures with 
either sensations or brain processes, is representative of both the trends and the 
knowledge at the time: ‘[t]here is not the faintest indication, to my knowledge, of 
the existence of a pleasure centre in the brain’ (1892: 634). One obvious reason why 
is just that midbrain structures are difficult to access, and the methods of the day 
did not permit deep brain stimulation experiments. Moreover, from the beginning 
to mid-20th century, much of the relevant research focused on behavioral responses 
to external rewarding stimuli rather than conative or cognitive experience or neural 
localization. 
As for the second stream, the story of DA does have an interesting prehistory, 
dating back to 1910–1911. Independently of each other, George Barger & Alfred 
Ewins (1910), working at the Wellcome Physiological Research Laboratory in 
London, and Mannich & Jacobson (1910), working at the University of Berlin’s 
Institute of Pharmacology, first synthesized DA. With Barger, Henry Dale (1910) 
began characterizing its pharmacological effects in cats. A year later, the Polish 
chemist Casimir Funk (1911) first synthesized DOPA at the Lister Institute of 
Preventive Medicine in London. Torquato Torquati unwittingly isolated the 
precursor L-dopa, and his (1913) results were more robustly chemically 
																																																						
6 In more recent literature in the 1990s and beyond, the computational functions of DA in relation 
to reward prediction error, incentive salience, and precision have become important research foci (see 
Colombo (2014) for an overview; see also Colombo & Wright 2017). While constructs like 
COMPUTATIONAL EQUIVALENCE and ISOMORPHISM are employed to characterize DA activity 
computationally, they differ from the concept IDENTITY and so cannot just be substituted for it. If this 
literature vindicates any philosophical frameworks, functionalism would likely come before HIT.	
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characterized by Markus Guggenheim (1913) at Hoffman LaRoche in Switzerland, 
who self-experimented with large doses of L-dopa. But despite this burst of 
research in numerous labs in various countries, there were no attempts to connect 
up these biochemical results with research about either neural or psychological 
states, and so no attempts to state psychoneural identities. Indeed, the realization 
that DA occurs naturally in the brain was still several decades off (Roe 1997). 
While it has long been established that the 1950s marked the outset of research 
into BRF, it is also possible that advocates might instead claim that research into 
BRF in the 1950s was insufficiently developed to have warranted any scientists 
making any heuristic identity claims. That maneuver gives the appearance of playing 
a shell game, however, which shelters HIT from potentially problematic cases. 
Secondly, in pursuing it, advocates of HIT incur the burden of providing a general 
answer about the conditions on research maturation. More problematically still, the 
maneuver may backfire, since cases where identity claims are made only after 
research has sufficiently developed may be cases that better support the traditional 
identity theory over HIT.  
 
4.2. CARTESIANISM TO THE RESCUE? 
 
A more plausible response stems from the observation that both Cartesianism 
about animal minds and behaviorism were paradigmatic in psychology in the 1950s; 
and either one may have inhibited neuroscientists’ willingness to theorize about 
psychological states or processes as the relata of identity relations. 
While the cognitive revolution was in full swing by 1959–1960, this historical 
context is certainly important not to underlook. However, in so looking, observe 
that the literature published during this period of serendipitous discovery on non-
human animal subjects was perfectly sanguine in ascribing mental states like 
pleasure, reward, motivation, and emotion. For instance, Brady’s (1955) ICSS 
experiments focused on ‘motivational–emotional factors’. For his part, Olds 
described his experiments with Milner in terms of experimentation on “higher 
feelings’ such as love, fear, pain, and pleasure’, and construed ICSS experiments on 
rats as a psychological method for detecting and measuring positive emotional 
behavior—pleasure and the satisfaction of specific ‘wants’ (1956b: 105, 107); 
moreover, commentators at the time interpreted these descriptions as such: e.g., 
‘Olds has proposed that the pleasure system works as a positive feedback 
mechanism […]’ (Pribram 1960: 9). 
Early 1960s studies of electrical stimulation on human subjects’ mental states and 
processes were also no less sanguine. Not only did they lend support to Olds’s 
initial hypotheses, but also they continued to resort to the language of ‘production’ 
and ‘correlation’—not identity, nor even equality—to do so.7 For instance, Heath 
stated that ‘[t]he findings reported herein are consistent with other data obtained in 
our depth electrode studies in man which indicate a correlation between activity of 
the septal region and the pleasure response’ (1972: 15–16). And as Sem-Jacobsen 
reported, ‘[f]eeling of ease and relaxation, feeling of joy with smiling, and great 
satisfaction have been elicited from different areas. (1959: 414). Consequently, it’s 
worth considering whether neuroscientists’ willingness to experiment on and 
theorize about psychological states was inhibited by either Cartesianism about 
animal minds or behaviorism; but as an explanation for the lack of identity 
																																																						
7 See, e.g., Sem-Jacobsen (1959); Delgado & Hamlin (1960); Bishop et al. (1963); Heath (1963); 
Heath & Gallant (1964). 
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statements at the outset of research, this one provides insufficient cover. 
 
4.3. RETHINKING HIT’S OTHER CASE STUDIES 
 
The absence of identity statements at the outset of inquiry into the nature of BRF, 
heuristic or otherwise, warrants scrutiny of the claim that HIT captures a widely-
used research strategy, as well as a closer look back at the original cases put forward 
in support of HIT. Upon closer scrutiny, those original cases provide the support 
for HIT only under a very heterodox conceptualization of identity.  
 
4.3.1. pFC processing and memory 
One can be a mechanist without being a heuristic identity theorist, just as one can 
be a heuristic identity theorist without being a mechanist: these two theories are 
logically independent. So it is interesting that Bechtel (2008b: 78) describes Endel 
Tulving’s neuroimaging research on episodic memory as an ‘exemplar of a heuristic 
identity claim’. Exemplary in what sense? Bechtel’s answer is this: 
 
Tulving and collaborators advanced the hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry (HERA) 
hypothesis according to which the left pFC is more involved than the right in encoding 
information about novel events (and in retrieval of information from semantic memory), 
while the right pFC is more involved than the left in tasks involving retrieval of episodic 
memories. […] HERA is a bold hypothesis implying that different brain areas are responsible 
for the operations of encoding and retrieval of episodic memories. It constitutes an important 
step towards developing a functional decomposition into component operations of the 
overall mechanism presumed responsible for episodic memory. As is often the case, such 
initial steps do not settle the matter, but prepare the way for further research. (2008b: 77–78) 
 
As Bechtel presented it, Tulving hypothesized that different areas of the pFC are 
differentially ‘involved in’ and ‘responsible for’ different mnemonic operations. 
Elsewhere, he suggested that the relation hypothesized by Tulving was the ‘linking’ 
relation (2008a: 990). But involvement is not identity; it is not even equality or 
equivalence. Mutatis mutandis for the linking relation: hypothesizing or even 
demonstrating that two relata are linked is to state or show little more than that they 
are co-related. Nor are the predicates ‘being responsible for’ and ‘being identical 
with’ even approximately coextensive, and neither does the former advance beyond 
a correlation in its implications. Consequently, HIT seems to have a bait-and-switch 
problem; for where the identity relation should be posited, as would be expected of 
an identity theorist, we are treated only to the much weaker ‘linking’ and 
‘involvement’ relations between brain structures and mental operations. 
 
4.3.2. FFA processing and face perception 
Advocates have recruited another case to support HIT: research on face perception 
in relation to activity in the fusiform face area (FFA). But, here, too, the same 
problems recur. 
Nancy Kanwisher and colleagues reported a three-part fMRI study that they 
took to warrant the claim that ‘[FFA] is selectively involved in the perception of 
faces’; they further suggested that disconfirmation of alternative hypotheses 
increases the probability that face perception and recognition is indeed localized in 
FFA: ‘the elimination of these main alternative hypotheses provides compelling 
evidence that [FFA …] is specifically involved in the perception of faces’ (1997: 
4302, 4309).  
After rehearsing these ‘involvement’-claims, McCauley took the liberty of 
construing them as direct evidence for HIT: 
 
 12 
[a]fter providing additional negative experimental evidence against a few more of the 
prominent alternative hypotheses, Kanwisher, McDermott, and Chun identify activity in the 
FFA with the (psychological) task of face perception. Their protestation about ‘compelling 
evidence’ notwithstanding, they have advanced a theoretically provocative, cross-scientific, 
hypothetical identity. (2012: 199) 
 
McCauley’s misrepresentation of the scientists’ claims is no isolated incident; 
advocates of HIT have presented a unified front: ‘the identity claim, then, is that the 
process of face recognition is identical to the activity of the FFA’ (Burnston et al. 
2011: 111). Granted, statements such as ‘face recognition processes are identical to 
FFA processes’ or ‘the activity of recognizing faces is identical to the activity of the 
FFA’ are indeed identity statements. The trouble is that the statements were 
asserted, or even invented—not by Kanwisher and her colleagues—but by 
advocates of HIT themselves.8 
For their part, the scientists neither explicitly asserted nor tacitly implied or 
committed themselves to any such identity claims. What they did conclude is the 
weaker claim that that FFA is selectively involved in the perception of faces. And 
not only have they yet to publicly endorse HIT, they have consistently articulated 
this weaker and more cautious conclusion for almost two decades. For example, in 
their review of the literature of face perception, Kanwisher & Yovel summarized 
their position as follows: ‘[i]n this chapter, we described the current state of 
knowledge about face-selective regions of cortex in humans and their role in face 
perception. Current evidence supports the hypothesis that the FFA is specifically 
involved in face perception per se’ (2009: 853–854).9  
 
4.4. CASTING A BROADER NET 
 
The failure of BRF research to confirm HIT prompted a reappraisal of the cases 
previously invoked to support HIT; in turn, closer scrutiny of those cases reveals 
not only that identity statements do not occur in their respective scientific 
literatures, either, but also that advocates are doing substantial interpretative work in 
understanding the research.  
HIT advocates have not articulated what they count as identities. But Bechtel & 
McCauley (1999) and McCauley & Bechtel (2001) do motivate HIT as one way of 
responding to objections against the traditional type-identity theory in the 
philosophy of mind—more on this in §5—and do emphasize that HIT embeds the 
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (i.e., the converse of ‘Leibniz’s law’). So, 
while it is not impossible that they have a heterodox conceptualization in mind, the 
far simpler and more natural interpretation is just that they construe identity 
classically (i.e., as a dyadic equivalence relation with the usual features: reflexivity, 
symmetry, transitivity, bijectivity, etc.). But if identity is understood in this way, then 
HIT suffers from a lack of empirical support.  
																																																						
8 Given that the reputation of HIT is staked on increased sensitivity to actual scientific practice, it’s 
troubling that readers who are unfamiliar the Kanwisher paper are simply just forced to take these HIT 
claims at face value. If this reputation is bought at the price of ignoring rudimentary metaphysical 
issues about relations, then it is a price not worth paying. 
9 One reason why Kanwisher, Haxby, Yovel, and other researchers have not asserted the identity 
of FFA activity and the perceptual processing of faces is that FFA activity was always only part of the 
neuroanatomical story, and scientists knew this two decades ago. Current understanding suggests that 
the network is functionally partitioned into ventral and dorsal streams, which are constituted in part by 
face-selective areas in both the anterior and posterior superior temporal sulcus (aSTS-FA, pSTS-FA), 
the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG-F), and the anterior temporal and right occipital lobes (ATL-FA, OFA) 
(Duchaine & Yovel 2015). Because the mechanism(s) enjoy a complex localization through a network 
of neural areas and pathways, face perception is not identical with FFA activity. 
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Of course, since its advocates have not specified how they conceive of identity, 
perhaps what these results reveal is that HIT requires a broader conceptualization 
of identity—one with non-strict criteria, which encompasses causal and functional 
relations, plus relations of localization and correlation in addition to equivalence or 
equality. 
On this broader understanding of identity, the cases previously reviewed would 
provide empirical support for HIT. But it also incurs problems. One is that HIT no 
longer appears as a genuine alternative to the type-type identity theory, so much as a 
misleading relabeling of mechanists’ strategies for mechanism discovery. Relatedly, 
the reconceptualization is heterodox at best, and not obviously a theory of identity. 
And it would fail to distinguish between different kinds of hypotheses advanced 
during early stages of scientific research, which may play different heuristic roles in 
scientific discovery, explanation, and confirmation. 
Ultimately, then, advocates appear caught in a dilemma: either HIT adequately 
describes scientific practice but not psychoneural identity, or else HIT adequately 
describes psychoneural identity but not scientific practice.10 In the next two 
sections, we focus on further worries and argue that HIT suffers from conceptual 
confusion. Meantime, we conclude that the case-based inductive argument for HIT 
remains weak: at present, there is no chronicle of any cavalcade of heuristic 
identities. 
 
 
5. HIT as Type-identity Theory? 
 
5.1. CORRELATION OBJECTION 
 
5.1.1. Mapping, correspondence, identity 
HIT was motivated, in part, by the need to respond to the so-called ‘correlation 
objection’ to the traditional mind/brain identity theory. According to Bechtel & 
McCauley (1999: 67, 69), the objection is as follows. While neuroscientists can 
discern and isolate certain brain states or processes that are correlated or associated 
with certain mental states or processes, there is no possible evidence that could 
support advancing from correlations to identities that would not also apply, eo ipso, 
to the correlations themselves. So identity theorists cannot establish the actual 
identity of neural and psychological states, but only their regular correlation; 
statements about psychoneural correlations exhaust the factual content of 
hypothesized identity statements. 
In response, Bechtel & McCauley averred that ‘mapping at least some mental 
states (viz., many that figure in scientific psychology) one-to-one with physical states 
is a perfectly normal part of research in cognitive neuroscience’ (1999: 67). And 
indeed it is. But how does this response address the correlation objection? 
For a function ƒ: M ® P from the domain of (descriptions of) mental states or 
processes to the codomain of (descriptions of) physical states or processes to be 
one-to-one, every image of the codomain must be mapped to by at most one 
argument of the domain. Hence, if ƒ(x) = ƒ(y) implies x = y for all x, y Î M, then 
indeed, every mental state or process can be injectively mapped with physical states 
or processes. The mapping need not also be onto; presumably, some physical states 
(e.g., total persistent vegetative coma) won’t themselves backmap to mental states 
or processes. But neither will it be one-to-one unless every—not just at least 
some—image of the codomain gets mapped to by each argument xi. 
																																																						
10 We thank one referee for helping us frame the problem this way. 
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Genuine one-to-one mappings might also be insufficient if the kinds of 
mappings required to warrant type-type mind/brain identity statements have to be 
invertible. Relatedly, while an identity function i(x) = x has the feature of being one-
to-one, it also has the feature of being onto; since solely one-to-one functions don’t 
have that feature, neither will they just be an identity function unless upgraded 
further. So what’s needed is an identity relation, not Bechtel & McCauley’s injective 
‘mapping of at least some mental states’. 
Moreover, a mapping that is both one-to-one and onto will give us the 
correspondence relation. But the correspondence relation differs from identity. For 
example, in the truth literature, correspondence theorists contend that true 
propositions correspond to facts; among their arch-rivals are the identity theorists, 
most of whom take facts just to be true propositions. Just as we would err in 
confusing their respective theories, we ought to distinguish mind/brain 
correspondence theories from identity theories. Even if we further upgraded what 
Bechtel & McCauley had in mind to a bijective mapping, the correlation objection 
may still be gripping; for even if each mental state or process in the domain were 
uniquely mapped to and from each physical state or process in the codomain, it 
would follow that mental and physical states or processes are isomorphic but not 
yet that the mental and physical states or processes of each ordered pair are 
indistinguishable with respect to any/all of their features. Isomorphism is not 
automorphism. 
 
5.1.2. Establishing identities 
Bechtel & McCauley offer a second response to the correlation objection on behalf 
of type-identity theory: ‘In a perversely Humean spirit, [objectors] set the bar 
impossibly high, requiring identity theorists to establish each identity claim’s truth—
in effect—beyond a shadow of a doubt. Discredited in philosophy of science, 
verificationism, oddly, enjoys new life in philosophy of mind.’ (1999: 69). 
First, the correlation objection neither entails nor is entailed by verificationism, 
whether in the philosophies of science or mind or semantics or elsewhere. These 
are orthogonal ideas. Second, whether the stronger case for any putative identities 
ultimately always collapses into the weaker case for correlations or correspondences 
does not pertain to the project of doubt-removal, whether construed in terms of the 
achievement of epistemic states like knowledge or the occurrence of psychological 
states like certainty and overconfidence. So the suggestions that the correlation 
objection either has given new life to verificationism, or implies a requirement to 
establish beyond a shadow of a doubt the truth of an identity statement, are largely 
immaterial. In this passage, Bechtel & McCauley have introduced a red herring; and 
so if there are good responses to the correlation objection, this is not one of them. 
Still, one may suspect that spirited Humeans are afoot. Suppose that s is an 
identity statement of the form ‘Fa = Fb’. Given that s only if ‘s’ is true, then for S 
to establish identity statements just is for S to establish truths about the actual 
identity of those neural and psychological states. Is this, as Bechtel & McCauley 
complain, a bar too high? Well, any such bar that can be raised by alethic ascent can 
also be lowered; for the familiar T-schemata sanction a logical equivalence between 
truth-apt identity statements and explicit ascriptions of truth to them. Given that ‘s’ 
is true only if s, then for S to establish truths about the actual identity of neural and 
psychological states just is for S to establish those identity statements. 
Consequently, and contra Bechtel & McCauley, the correlation objection does not 
necessarily require identity theorists to establish each identity claim’s truth, much 
less beyond a shadow of a doubt. Rather, the objector can just as well be 
understood as just challenging identity theorists to establish any identity statement. 
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5.2. NECESSITY 
 
With their Kripkean counterparts, advocates of HIT also take identity statements to 
be neither analytic nor a priori; but while synthetic and a posteriori, they deny that 
identities have their truth-values necessarily: they are neither necessarily true nor 
necessarily false. Instead, advocates take them to be possibly true but probably false. 
Of course, familiar arguments take this idea to be a mistake. Given the modal 
necessity of self-identity, it seems to follow that if any two individuals a and b are 
identical then necessarily they are identical: 
 
(a = b)     [supposition of identity] 
( (a = a)    [necessity of self-identity] 
( (a = a) É  (a = a))   [redundancy] 
( (a = a) É  (a = b))   [substitution] 
( (a = b)    [MP] 
(a = b) É ( (a = b))   [necessity of identity] 
 
The argument supposes an identity, and then uses the necessity of self-identity to 
validly demonstrate that identities are necessary. If HIT advocates deny the 
conclusion, likely they must also deny the initial premise—the supposition of 
contingent identity. After all, to suppose a contingent identity between a and b is to 
suppose that ‘a = b’ is true; but, pace HIT, ‘a = b’ is contingently untrue and merely 
plays a heuristic role. Yet, if ‘‘a = b’ is a contingently untrue’ implies that a ¹ b, then 
the denial of ‘a = b’ looks to be the denial that an identity holds—not the 
acceptance or advancement of a special kind of heuristic identity.11 So the issue is 
not easy to waive off. More problematically, if all identities are necessary and 
heuristic ‘identities’ are not necessary, then neither are they identities. 
 
5.3. HEURISTIC IDENTITY STATEMENTS AS PREMISES 
 
Scientific explanation and prediction have often been reformulated argumentatively. 
Accordingly, Bechtel & McCauley take identity statements play the role of premises 
in explanatory arguments, and take the statements themselves to need no further 
explanation.12 One reason why is that scientists cannot be said to come to 
explanatory knowledge of what is contingently untrue. Consequently, unless 
scientists infer them from false premises, heuristic identity statements cannot serve 
as the conclusions of good explanatory arguments. Advocates of HIT are happy to 
accept the latter disjunct: it is because heuristic identities cannot serve as the 
conclusions of good explanatory arguments that they must serve as their premises if 
they participate at all. 
But neither is it clear that heuristic identities can serve as the premises of good 
																																																						
11 To assert s just is to present s as being true. If identities are, ex hypothesi, disposable heuristics 
that are probably untrue, then scientists’ utterances of identities are unlikely to have the illocutionary 
force of assertion, pace HIT. Acceptance and advancement are not normatively constrained in the 
same way. 
12 See Bechtel & McCauley (1999: 69); McCauley & Bechtel (2001: 737, 753, 756); McCauley (2007: 
153); Bechtel (2008: 70); McCauley (2012: 192, 193). It is unclear whether HIT has anti-realist 
implications; but the presumption of identities being, ex hypothesi, false premises or input that 
inaugurate a period of scientific research severs the relationship between truth and success at the heart 
of the abductive inference for scientific realism. 
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explanatory arguments. Traditional identity theorists can conclude that a = b from 
the premises that mental state a = the state that has F and neural state b has F; or 
from the premises that mental state a is F and neural state b is F, but that only one 
state is F; or from others still. But whereas traditional identity theorists can generate 
valid reconstructions of explanatory arguments involving hypothetical identities, 
heuristic identity theorists cannot just transpose premises and conclusions without 
imputing invalid reasoning to scientists; for from the premise that a = b, it does not 
follow that mental state a = the state that has F, nor that neural state b has F, nor 
their conjunction (even if all true). Likewise, neither does it follow that mental state 
a is F, nor that neural state b is F, nor that only one state is F, nor their conjunction.  
So, given that premises and conclusions cannot be simply transposed, the 
thought that hypothetical identity statements are not the conclusions of scientific 
research but the premises leaves unaddressed—unlike the traditional version—what 
sorts of conclusions HIT takes to be derived from those identities. 
Worse, the claim that identities are premises also threatens to misrepresent the 
dispute between the traditional and heuristic versions. Various philosophers of 
mind (e.g., Hill 1991; Kim 1996; McLaughlin 2001) have argued that identity is the 
best explanation of strong correlations of properties but not vice-versa; but in that 
case, statements of correlations serve as derived conclusions while identity 
statements serve as premises in the traditional identity theory no less than the 
hypothetical identity claims of HIT. Moreover, traditional identity theorists can 
likewise accept that identities do not themselves require explanations. Yet, as Polger 
(2004: 32, 37) argues, it is because identities are necessary that no further 
explanation of them is needed. 
 
 
6. Does HIT Rest on Confusion? 
 
6.1. EQUIVOCATION 
 
In the caption of the ‘locations of function’ diagram in Olds’s Scientific American 
paper, he wrote, ‘[t]he labels here identify the centers which correspond to those 
investigated in the rat’ (1956b: 107). Obviously enough, ‘identify’ here means little 
more than ‘name’ or ‘denote’, and has nothing to do with the sense of identity 
relevant to any traditional version of identity theory. Yet, in re-examining HIT’s 
celebrated case studies, notice that advocates frequently confuse two kinds of claims 
by equivocating over ‘identity’ and ‘identity’-esque terms: claims about the ‘identity’ 
of states and claims about ‘identifying’ (or discovering) states. The former concerns 
a particular kind of relation, identity, while the latter concerns scientists’ 
recognitional abilities to detect and characterize. The former is relevant to 
evaluating whether HIT is a genuine version of identity theory; the latter is a Trojan 
horse. 
The equivocation works by first focusing on the scientific endeavor of 
‘identifying’ phenomena—i.e., detecting a neural structure or discerning a mental 
operation—and then by exploiting the nominalization ‘identification’ to confuse the 
aforementioned senses of identity relation and detection/recognition abilities. To 
take one example, Bechtel self-describes the ‘approach, which [he and McCauley] 
have dubbed heuristic identity theory’, as ‘requir[ing] not just identifying the brain 
areas associated with cognitive tasks but using such identifications as heuristic 
guides to understanding how the brain performs those tasks’ (2008b: 50; see also 
Bechtel 2012: 4; McCauley 2012: 199). Here, HIT is described as requiring two 
things: firstly, that brain areas be discovered and recognized for what they are and 
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what they do. But again, recognition is one thing, identity something altogether 
different. Secondly, HIT is described as requiring that brain areas be ‘associated 
with cognitive tasks’. But neither is identity mere association, on any analysis; claims 
about psychoneural associations or correlations are not intersubstitutable for 
psychoneural identities. 
The confusion of, and equivocation on, these two kinds of claims is no isolated 
incident.13 For instance, Bechtel goes on to describe ‘recent research that is directed 
towards identifying the brain structures involved when people perform various 
memory tasks can play a heuristic role in identifying the mental operations involved’ 
(2008b: 71), which ramifies throughout his discussion of ‘ways in which identifying 
working parts of a neural mechanism can serve a heuristic role in identifying mental 
operations’ (2008b: 76). Of course, it’s perfectly reasonable to maintain that 
scientists who ascertain that some entity is what performs an activity (that π is y-
ing, that y-ing occurs in π, etc.) have thereby performed an identifying act; but 
identifying acts in this sense of recognition and ascertainment are irrelevant to the 
debate with traditional identity theorists over whether mental states and processes 
are type-type identical to neural states and processes.14 And this irrelevance prompts 
the worry that the whole of HIT rests on a mistake. 
 
6.2. IDENTITIES AS MERE LOCALIZATIONS 
 
Mechanists maintain that phenomena are scientifically explained in terms of 
mechanisms, but there is no consensus on how best to characterize the relationship 
between them. Different mechanists have focused on different kinds of 
relationships, including those picked out by the phrases being responsible for, producing, 
underlying, and maintaining. None of these relationships amount to a (heuristically-
described) identity relationship. 
The contemporary analysis of mechanisms is framed using structure versus 
function and entity versus activity distinctions, applied in both inter- and intralevel 
contexts.15 By their very nature, mechanisms and mechanistic systems are both 
hierarchical and mereological, in at least the sense that they are constituted, inter 
alia, by part/whole relations between structures at different levels.16 Construed 
functionally, a mechanistic activity f-ing is composed of component activities y1, 
…, yn, each of which is the activity of at least one component entity πi. Construed 
structurally, a mechanism S is composed of component entities π1, …, πn, each of 
which interacts with other such entities in virtue of performing at least one activity 
yi. The component parts—whether activities or entities—occur at lower levels than 
																																																						
13 Nor is it confined to cognitive neuroscience. The confusion between the identity relation, on 
one hand, and the event or activity of specifying one or more relata, on the other, was applied to cell 
biology and biochemistry too: ‘cytologists using various microscopes, identified various organelles in 
the cell, whereas biochemists, preparing homogenates and using various assays, identified chemical 
reactions’ (Bechtel & Hamilton 2007: 413). 
14 It also puts philosophers who are looking for an alternative to the standard psychoneural 
identity-cum-reduction accounts, and who are sympathetic to explanatory pluralism, in a bind. For 
example, Schouten & Looren de Jong tried to navigate the problem by artfully deploying phrases like 
‘identificatory connections between […] accounts of vision’ (2001: 801) in order to clarify HIT without 
committing themselves to the mistake. 
15 See, e.g., Bechtel (2002, 2008b); Craver & Bechtel (2007); Schouten & Looren de Jong (2001); 
Wright & Bechtel (2007); Wright (2007, 2012). 
16 It is important to clarify that the constitutive relevance relation differs from the kinds of identity 
relations posited by identity theorists. Unlike identity, constitutive relevance relations obtain between a 
whole and its part, and mechanists employ them for distinguishing relevant from irrelevant factors in a 
mechanism (see Craver & Bechtel 2007). 
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do the composite systemic activities and entities constituted by them. 
Localization and de-/composition are essential experimental and explanatory 
strategies in mechanistic science, and statements about them are ubiquitous. As 
Bechtel reminds, ‘[i]dentifying parts and operations requires decomposing a 
mechanism—taking it apart (actually, or in analysis) either structurally into its parts 
or functionally into its operations. One important part of this task is localizing 
operations in the parts that perform them.’ (2012: 4). While this is an entirely à 
propos rehearsal of mechanists’ doctrine, what advocates of HIT add is that 
statements about localization and identification are actually clandestine identity 
statements: 
 
[l]ocalization claims are identity claims between the parts characterized in terms of their 
physical constitutions and parts characterized in terms of the operations they are involved in.’ 
(ibidem) 
 
[s]ince localization claims maintain that it is the same entity that constitutes a particular 
structure and has performs [sic] a specific operation, they are identity claims in the sense 
advanced by the mind/brain identity theory.’ (Bechtel & Hamilton 2007: 413). 
 
Granted, the normal course of mechanistic science may involve scientists 
ascertaining that some component activity or function is performed by some 
component entity or structural part. But it does not follow that localization 
statements just are identity statements. (The seat of the soul is the pineal gland, says 
the Cartesian. But localizing the soul thus hardly suffices to unmask our Cartesian 
as a psychoneural identity theorist.)17 
First-order localization statements of the form ‘π has the activity y’ or ‘the y-ing 
is done by π’ have a basic subject-predicate structure. So, too, do second-order 
localization statements that predicate something to either possessive nominal (i.e., 
π’s y-ing) with grammatical landmark/trajector structure or the subject term of a 
definite description (the f-ing of S, etc.). But there is a yawning logical difference 
between statements of predication and attribution versus statements of identity, and 
mechanists have no good reason to go along with advocates of HIT in conflating 
the ‘is’ of predication with the ‘is’ of identity. 
Moreover, in quantifying over a particular component part πi as what has 
property F or what plays the functional role Fx, localization statements still express 
a simple predication of the form ‘$x such that Fx Ù x = πi’. Yet, none of this 
implies that operations and activities just are the entities that perform them. To take 
one example, phasic bursting (y-ing) is a basic operation of VTA DA neurons (π) in 
the mesocorticolimbic system (Grace 1991). But they are cross-categorical classes of 
phenomena—neither identical nor equivalent—and many other kinds of cells 
besides VTA DA neurons in many different neural areas besides the 
mesocorticolimbic system also engage in this kind of signaling. So bursting is 
localizable to VTA DA neurons, but is not identical with any of them or the 
property of being one. 
Consequently, there is no entailment from localization statements of the form ‘π 
is the locus of y-ing’ to identity statements of the form ‘π = y’ (Place’s assertion 
that ‘consciousness is a brain process’ did not mean merely that consciousness is 
localizable). So there is no good reason for either mechanists or traditional identity 
theorists to take aboard this additional non-sequitur, though the converse may 
																																																						
17 To qualify, for Descartes the pineal gland was full of animal spirits and was the interfacing 
organ between soul and body. Hence, the pineal gland’s relation to the soul was not intended to be 
one of identity. 
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hold.18 
 
6.3. INTRALEVEL IDENTITIES: A DUBIOUS AMMENDMENT  
 
As studied by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, the mental state or process of 
anhedonia in schizophrenic patients is a phenomenon residing at a far higher set of 
levels than the opioid states or processes in their ventral pallida, as studied by 
neuropharmacologists. According to the traditional mind/brain identity theory, a 
psychoneural identity statement about the relation of anhedonic experiences and 
opioid states in the ventral pallida would be an interlevel statement relating 
personal- and subpersonal-level states. 
Advocates of HIT were consistently clear that they, too, conceive of heuristic 
identities as cross-scientific interlevel statements. For instance, Bechtel & 
McCauley’s (1999: 69; 2001: 752–753) response to the challenge of multiple 
realizability across species was that articulation of the problem often neglects the 
issue of ‘grain’ between levels. More explicitly still, McCauley & Bechtel (2001: 736–
737) contended that HIT is expressly designed to accommodate the multilevel 
character of scientific progress, and that the heuristic identity statements they 
envision are ones that concern cross-scientific interlevel relationships. They wrote: 
 
[c]ross-scientific hypothetical identities are perfectly common means for abetting the study of 
some phenomenon at multiple levels of explanation […] and are heuristics of discovery that 
inspire multilevel programs of research. […] The theories at each level ascribe distinct 
properties to the entities and processes that the interlevel, hypothetical identities connect. 
(2001: 753) 
 
Additionally, Looren de Jong (2006: 439) alluded to the coupling of biophysical 
research on dipole generators with the electrophysiology of event-related potentials 
to understand psycholinguistic aspects of speech comprehension and production. 
Even if allusion to this research does not improve the inductive argument for HIT, 
Looren de Jong was right to note that claims about the ‘multilevel anarchistic level-
hopping’ seem empirically adequate. 
Unfortunately, the misconstrual of localization claims as identity statements has 
led advocates of HIT to begin asserting that heuristic identities are ultimately 
intralevel affairs. For instance, Bechtel & Hamilton wrote, ‘[t]he identity theory is 
often construed as advancing a reduction of psychology to neuroscience, since 
neuroscience is at a lower level than psychology. From the point of view of 
mechanistic explanation, […] accounts of the part of the system and the operation it 
is performing are at the same level’ (2007: 413). Burnston et al. make a similar point 
in the case of FFA: pace HIT, the psychological function of face recognition is 
eventually decomposed into more fine-grained subpersonal processes at lower 
levels, and some of those subpersonal processes are themselves eventually 
attributed to specific brain areas like FFA; ‘the identity statements that end up 
succeeding are intralevel—they are between different descriptions of phenomena at 
the same level of complexity’ (2011: 113). 
True, some activities do occur at the same level as some entities: e.g., action 
potentials and neurons are activities and entities at the same level. To take another 
																																																						
18 A common presumption is that the numerical identity of two things x and y explains their being 
co-located at a time; but co-location is not sufficient to infer that x = y. Moreover, recall that heuristic 
identities are characterized as thoroughly hypothetical empirical statements that are disposable and 
probably untrue; but the inference from truths about co-location to untrue heuristic identity 
statements is invalid. 
 20 
example, ‘oligodendrocytes generate myelin’ predicates the relational property of 
myelin-generation of members of the class of oligodendrocytes. Generating myelin 
is an intralevel affair, in part because it is a diachronic causally productive activity 
that occurs at the same level that oligodendrocytes occupy. But such activities 
manifest the usual causal features: asymmetry, non-synchronicity, distinctness of 
cause and effect, etc. By contrast, identity is a non-causal, symmetrical, reflexive, 
synchronic relation, and commonly held to be an interlevel affair. Consequently, 
one of the reasons for thinking that the relevant identities are indeed psychoneural 
is that they may have features that preclude them from being intralevel. 
Of course, with Burnston et al., we grant that descriptions of neural processes 
may eventually be predicated of specific descriptions of brain areas or parts, after 
many iterated rounds of decomposing psychological functions into exceedingly fine-
grained low-level subpersonal processes. But these are poor grounds for claiming 
that heuristic identities are localizing intralevel predications. For one thing, the 
component operations of a neural mechanism are not picked out with psychological 
vocabulary (e.g., descriptions of myelin-generation are not highly decomposed 
psychological functions). More importantly, the point of HIT was not to posit 
successful or true intralevel localization statements about highly decomposed neural 
phenomena and their neural activities at the end of inquiry. Rather, identities were 
supposed to be heuristically disposable interlevel psychoneural identity statements, 
which are made at the outset of research on the basis of scant evidence, and which 
express the cross-scientific relationship between neural phenomena and 
undecomposed psychological phenomena across levels. Consequently, the 
treatment of localization statements as identity statements is doubly problematic if it 
leads to the claim that heuristic identities are intralevel statements posited near the 
end of inquiry. 
 
 
7. Back to mechanistic explanation 
 
What the history of BRF research illuminates is exactly what closer scrutiny of the 
showcase examples of visual processing, memory encoding, and face perception 
also reveal: discussion of mechanistic discovery and explanation which over-
interprets identity-talk where either there is none or none is needed, and which 
bottoms out in claims about how de-/composition and localization statements are 
continually refined in light of new scientific discoveries. What the scientific 
literature does not reveal is evidence supporting HIT’s commitments to heuristic 
psychoneural identity claims being posited at the outset of research and playing a 
heuristic role in guiding explanatory projects. Instead, advocates of HIT seem to be 
confusing identity claims for a pastiche of other claims involving function, causal 
production, reduction, localization, and property instantiation. 
Whereas traditional metaphysics is often detached from the details of scientific 
practice—relying more on intuition, logic, and conceptual analysis—naturalized 
metaphysics directly serves it. HIT may be thought of as an exemplar of naturalized 
metaphysics, which delivers an empirically-grounded alternative to the traditional 
identity theory in philosophy of mind. Upon examination, however, HIT illustrates 
adverse aspects of both. Insufficient heed is paid to the textual evidence of the 
actual science, while logical, linguistic, and conceptual analysis is underutilized. If 
metaphysics and science are to interact fruitfully, we must combine a sophisticated 
understanding of scientific theory and practice with a metaphysician’s patience for 
rarified constructs and fine distinctions along with their demand for punctiliousness. 
HIT masquerades as an identity theory, a misnomer at best. But it fails to make 
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contact with the very theory it purports to displace, and it surrenders the 
competitive advantages that identity theorists previously worked hard to establish. 
As Polger observed, the idea of ‘interim’ hypothetical identities is entirely 
compatible with the thought that ‘heuristic identities, in the course of theory 
building, [are] replaced by more sophisticated realization relations’ (2004: 32; see 
also Schouten & Looren de Jong 2001: 802). For his part, Polger suggested that this 
compatibility implies that HIT offers no support to the identity theory that doesn’t 
also apply to functionalism in philosophy of mind. Yet, Polger’s concern generalizes 
beyond debates between identity theorists and functionalists; for any theoretical 
solution to the mind/body problem is compatible with the thought that scientific 
research begins with disposable heuristic identities, where ‘identity’ is understood 
broadly. 
Examples like BRF research are more than capable of demonstrating the virtues 
of the mechanists’ program in this regard. For instance, Pribram (1960: 10) 
presciently redescribed Olds’s ICSS findings using a now-standard mechanistic 
approach, without resorting to talk of identities, heuristic or otherwise. This is what 
advocates of HIT ultimately want, anyway: evidence of mechanism discovery and 
mechanistic explanation, understood in terms of functional decomposition and 
localization. As for identity, that should be left to the identity theorists. 
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